1971

Speeches Given Elsewhere

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

at the

DINNER HONORING SENATOR JOHN J. WILLIAMS

Hotel DuPont, Gold Ballroom

Wilmington, Delaware

Thursday, January 14, 1971, 7:00 p.m.

It is a pleasure to be in Delaware for this occasion. I come here out of respect and affection for John J. Williams. I am here, too, out of what can best be described as an affinity of the extremes. Your State, for example, is about 75 times smaller than mine. Delaware's hills would be lost in the shadows of Montana's high Rockies. Even Delaware's lovely ocean is dwarfed by the infinite blue of the Big Sky Country.

This contrast in dimensions has gone unnoticed in the Senate during the past few years. As a matter of fact, sometimes the roles were reversed 180 degrees. Delaware often appeared the giant. Not only did it appear to be, it was. It was so because of the man who brings us here tonight.

John J. Williams gave Delaware a towering presence in the Senate. His voice amplified the name of the State. The reputation of all Delawarians sparkled brighter in the mirror of his personal integrity.

Delaware took a town-councilman of Millsboro, little known outside this State, and sent him to Washington. Now, Delaware has got back a Senator of international renown and the nation's ombudsman for fiscal morality in the federal government.

Delaware's gain is the nation's loss. For me, John Williams' departure from the Senate is deeply felt in a personal sense. I miss, in particular, the breakfasts which we used to share regularly in the Senate cafeteria. Seven o'clock in the morning, as you know, is a no-nonsense time. It is no time for comedy. To put it bluntly, for many people, it is a grim and futile time. However, that hour with John Williams had another side. It was a time to put the problems of the nation and the world in clearer perspective. It was a time to match up our agreements and to define our disagreements.

Above all else, it was a time to establish an enduring friendship. Notwithstanding differences of party and approaches, our friendship has grown out of mutual candor and mutual respect. As I told the Senate a short time ago:

> "We have been at all times open with one another. At all times we knew where we each stood; and most important, perhaps, we respected each other's opinions."

All too seldom is one privileged to have that kind of friendship and that kind of trust. You will understand, then, what I mean when I say simply that I will miss John Williams. I will miss my friend in the Senate.

The nation, as I said, is also going to feel the departure of John Williams from the Senate. He has been a friend of frugality. He has been a force for fiscal morality. He has been a paragon of common sense.

John Williams had the courage to tread in the darker recesses of government and to illumine them with vivid reports on what he encountered. He served as a kind of lightening rod, attracting to himself the flashes of malfeasance and ineptitude which occur from time-to-time in public life as they do in private life.

That is no easy responsibility to assume in government. It is even more difficult to discharge it with justice and integrity. The fact is that if one chooses to delve into matters of this kind, the invitation to a spectacular witch-hunt is ever present. The media of communication is available at all times for the sensational. It is to his everlasting credit, however, that John Williams declined to play the part of Inquisitor. Rather, he hewed, with rugged honesty, to the line of human decency. He never yielded to the temptation to become a mere mouthpiece for malcontents. He bore no false witness. He did not even bear hasty witness.

John Williams studied and pondered the evidence. Always he pressed for facts and more facts. He did not speak until he was persuaded that he had the facts. Even then, he invariably gave advance notice to persons who might be affected by them. When he spoke out against malfeasance, he did so out of a sense of duty. It was never news to the individuals involved; they had already been put on notice. Often, however, it came as a shock to the rest of us. His exposition of the facts invariably pulled the wool away from our eyes.

John Williams made his weight felt in all parts of the federal government. He concerned himself with the Internal Revenue Service, the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Federal Housing Administration and other agencies. I am frank to say that he also found it necessary to concern himself with certain matters in the Senate. In the end, however, all of these institutions and others gained strength from the catharsis of his honest inquiry.

He probed the questionable doings of individuals in both parties and without reference to party. On occasion, his work led to the discovery of those whose ambitions or cupidity had exceeded their personal prudence and public dedication. More often, he encountered and revealed thoughtless wastages of public funds. The extent of the savings for which he was responsible will never be known. In all probability, many hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds were involved.

In the Senate, John Williams did what needed doing without pretense or fancy credentials. He had no high-powered staff. He had no image-makers. He had only the sheer force of an unadorned common sense--combined with an uncommon diligence. He is a living monument to the principle that an interested citizen--to be sure a gifted one in this instance--can master both the politics and the fiscal complexities of the federal government; he can do it, moreover, even in the absence of special training, tutelage, or political apprenticeship.

That is as it should be. Representative government in the United States is not and ought not to become the exclusive province of a specialized elite. A society of free citizens requires the participation in government of the range of free citizens. It is one of the vitalities of the Senate that its doors have been wide open in that respect.

In its long history, many paths have led to the United States Senate. Farmers, lawyers, workers, doctors, businessmen, teachers, artists, miners, soldiers, to mention a few, have trod them. The outstanding work of John Williams in the Senate now adds to that list. He came to the Senate from the chicken feed business. That occupation may well prove to be one of the best training grounds yet for the mastery of the not-so-chicken feed finances of the federal government.

John Williams left the Senate at his own insistance. He left at a pinnacle of political acceptance. He left not because he was unable to carry the taxing burdens of a Senator's office. Rather

he left because he has some stubborn ideas about retirement age. In this connection, as in some others, we are in disagreement. His departure from the Senate, in my judgment, was not timely; it was premature. John Williams sees it another way. I admit that in withdrawing from the Senate, he was practicing what he preached. So I will not press the point. Since I am older than he and still a Member of the Senate, I would not like him to accuse me of preacing what I practice.

So far as I can see, only two good results emerge from the retirement of John Williams. In the first place, Caleb Boggs will be elevated to the role of senior Senator from Delaware. I know him well. I have been with him on two Presidential missions abroad. He wears well. He travels well. He has already made an outstanding contribution to the work of the Senate. There is more, much more, to come from him for the benefit of this State and for the nation.

The retirement of John Williams also strengthens the Montana influence in the Senate. I was delighted to note that Senator-elect Roth, whose roots are now imbedded in Delaware, was born in Great Falls, Montana. Indeed, he was once a student of mine at the University. His entering the Senate, not as a Democrat, but as a Republican, I trust, is not indicative of the negligible impact of my teaching on him.

We are waiting, now, in the Senate with great interest to see what new career will be pursued by our old colleague, John Williams. We do not regard it as likely that he will withdraw into the high Himalayas for a life of contemplation. There is always the possibility, of course, that he may join Ralph Nader. It seems to us much more likely, however, that he will simply transfer his base of operations from Capitol Hill to a sort of Olympus-in-Millsboro. From this delightful spot, he can continue to hurl well-aimed thunderbolts at targets across the land. We will be listening for the distant rumble of his voice--to the words of this outstanding American, this Senator for all seasons, John J. Williams of Delaware.

January 24, 1971

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

at the Funeral of

Senator Richard Brevard Russell

What is fifty years in public life?

It is the end of a war long ago and a young lawyer's practice in a town where the railroad runs through cotton fields. It is the lift of a first election and a seat in a State legislature.

It is an ear given to the past and to the words of a family rich in the law, the bible and the bitter fruits of an ancient war.

It is an ear given to the present, to neighbors who need and do not need, to the rich and the poor, to the harsh and the gentle, to the black and to the white. It is the Speaker's chair in the Georgia House and the learning of the machinery through which freedom seeks to speak.

What is fifty years in public life?

It is the confidence of a people whose confidence in all else has been shaken. It is the agony of an empty public purse when many hands stretch out for help.

It is a fury of frustration as the land dries up and factories stand still even as men go in want and there are the sounds of violent discontent rising. It is the weighing of plea against plea, hope against hope, need against need. It is a mandate to decide, whether it is easy to decide or hard.

It is a Governor's House in a nation's dark hours.

What is fifty years in public life?

It is a long journey to a nation's capitol and to the Senate of the United States. It is the mixing of an old experience and a new.

It is another war, another, an d another yet, and a militant defense of the nation's defense.

It is the pleas of a people remembered out of the past and the means, at last to respond to them.

It is all the ways that States draw strength from the federal government.

It is school lunches and food for the hungry, the farmer helped, the roads built, the schools expanded and the dignity of hope reborn.

It is the mastery of new legislative machinery and, as conscience compels, its vigorous use.

It is, at last, the Chair of the Senate of the United States and the high trust of a nation.

Fifty years in public life. . .

It closes where it began, where it is green and there is the smell of pines.

Richard Brevard Russell

Winder, Georgia

A Senator of the United States.

REMARKS FOR SENATOR MANSFIELD AT SENATE HISTORIC DOCUMENTS CEREMONIES

April 20, 1971

It has been said that we are a government of laws not of men. It may be added that we are also a government of paper. The event which draws us together here today is not so much in celebration of that fact as it is a celebration of the survival of a few papers which make government meaningful.

What goes on display here today is but a minute distillation of the millions of documents which have bound this government together since its beginning. Each of these documents was selected for its intrinsic significance. Together, they serve to remind us, out of the profusion of the past, that the process of documentation is what gives permanence and continuity to the institutions of government. The ideas we carry in our heads and the agreements we reach in the give and take of political debate are of no use to the future unless they are accurately recorded and preserved.

The documentary record is of particular interest in the intricate relationship between the Presidency and the Senate. Born of Constitutional compromise, the relationship, especially in the early years, was the object of experimentation and testing. It withstood and survived, of course, and stands today as the evolutionary product of the precedents established over the years.

The Senate's historic document collection comprises the living record of this evolutionary process. These are original documents, signed by the Presidents and in some cases executed entirely in their own hand. The first of them which goes on display today was signed by George Washington more than 181 years ago.

This first Washington document itself provides a significant essay on the need for the intermediary of the written word in the relationship between the Executive and the Senate. It shows how, in the early months of the Republic, the first President conducted an uncomfortable experiment in substituting his personal presence for the more formal transaction of business by paper.

President Washington was acutely aware that his every act and word as the nation's first chief executive would be regarded as precedent for the future. He was particularly concerned about those parts of the Constitution which while clear as to what should be done were not so clear as to how to do it. A notable case in point was Article II, Section 2. It stipulates that the process of making treaties and nominating ambassadors and other high officers should be undertaken "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

Washington had to determine, by experiment, the most effective method for giving and receiving such advice and consent. While he was quite firm in his belief that nominations should be transmitted in writing, he apparently felt that the intricacies of treaty-making might justify a face-to-face confrontation with the Senate. Accordingly, he sent the letter which we have here today declaring his intention to meet with the Senate "to advise with them on the terms of the treaty to be negotiated with the Southern Indians."

Historians tell us that it was not a successful confrontation. The process of verbal communication was long and cumbersome, complicated by the competition of street noises from passing carriages. Most important, apparently, was the fact that the presence of the President of the United States on the rostrum of the Senate had an inhibiting effect on Senatorial debate. The treaty was referred to committee, accordingly, where it could be considered in a more relaxed atmosphere. The President departed in what one observer called "a discontented air." He transmitted all subsequent treaty messages in writing and it was 130 years before another President would come to the Senate to discuss a treaty, and that was the occasion of the submission of the Treaty of Versailles by Woodrow Wilson.

The failure of that first effort at personal representation by President Washington set the stage for our being here today. For it led to the practice of conducting all subsequent advice and consent transactions on paper and it thereby assured the Senate of this unique collection of documents.

Fortunately for us today, one man had the historical perspective and good sense to recognize the worth of these papers nearly 100 years ago while the earliest files of the Senate were still intact. That was the then Secretary of the Senate, Anson G. McCook, who in 1885 began to assemble and preserve the collection. I am very pleased to note that Secretary McCook's daughter, Mrs. Katharine McCook Knox, is able to be here with us today to help celebrate the opening of this display.

Thanks to the foresight of Secretary McCook and those who followed him, the Senate collection now contains several hundred documents, each of which marks a significant step in the relationship between the Senate and the Presidency. The Senate Commission on Art and Antiquities intends to place the collection on rotating display as part of a continuing effort to promote understanding of the rich heritage of this branch of the federal legislature. We invite your attention to the display and hope you will find it a source of interest and, above all, a reminder of the human dimension which lies behind the affairs of state.

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

at a

TESTIMONIAL DINNER IN HONOR OF SENATOR GEORGE D. AIKEN

SAINT MICHAEL'S COLLEGE, WINOOSKI, VERMONT

Saturday, May 1, 1971

I am delighted to have an opportunity to come to Vermont for this tribute to George Aiken. Your most distinguished Senator also happens to be my oldest friend in the Senate. My regard for him is such that I would be delighted to sing his praises--even from the top of your highest mountain. Perhaps, I should say, especially from that mountain, since I have the honor to share its name.

It is one of the marks of the civility of the Senate that a close personal association such as I have with Senator Aiken bridges the gap of party politics. I would note in this connection that we share breakfast almost daily in the Senate cafeteria. It is served at an early hour and in the morning

the problems of the nation have always seemed to stand in clearest perspective. At least the breadth of vision of George Aiken makes them so appear. Having been exposed to his judgments for many years, I can understand the basis of his reputation for sharp perception. In the aviary of the Senate, George Aiken is catalogued as neither hawk nor dove but as a very wise owl.

Rather than heap redundant praise on his shoulders, however, I would like to share with you instead a few thoughts on the impact which I believe George Aiken's presence in the Senate has had on the face of this State, the nation and the world.

When I see Senator Aiken in these delightful surroundings and among old friends, I find it difficult to understand why he ever left home. It is much easier to understand why he comes back so often; he is of the very rock and earth of Vermont.

I know that he could have remained and settled down as a successful raspberry farmer.

He could have remained and continued his work in the field of horticulture and his highly original investigations of wild flowers.

He could have stayed here as a local school director and state legislator.

He was equipped to follow any and all of those occupations. Any one of them, alone, would have been more than sufficient distinction for a lifetime. In short, he could have remained in Putney and put together what would have been a very appealing and most comfortable life.

But George Aiken, to borrow the phrase of another Vermonter, "took a road less travelled." He left his heart here as he followed a family tradition of high public service. When he moved into the arena of State and federal responsibility,

however, he continued to resist the comfortable security of the moment. His native honesty led him to reject the easy and the expedient. Rather, he chose to immerse himself, progressively, in more complex aspects of public leadership and, just as one achievement in Vermont led to another, each political summit in Washington has expanded his vision to new horizons.

He chose, for example, not co-existence with vested interests, but struggle against monopolistic practices in the supply of electric power.

Rather than a narrow partisanship, he urged on his party a positive and constructive outlook. He did so at a time when it would have been easier to go along with a blatant partisanship. It is small wonder that Democrats in this State ever since, have been hard-pressed to find a candidate to run against him. In his last election, I understand, the challenge to him was such that he was compelled to expend on his campaign the grand total of $17.09.

George Aiken has never pursued change for the sake of change. Neither has he been wedded to the traditional way of doing things out of a sterile traditionalism. Rather, his common sense has always been receptive to new ideas. Change does not come easily in government, but over the years, the advocacies which George Aiken fought for have borne fruit.

A notable case in point is the extension of electrical power service to the rural areas of the nation. In 1938, Governor Aiken was able to tell the people of Vermont that within two years electric power would be available to every community in the State. His prophecy has long since come true and as the years have passed, electricity has emerged as a key factor in the revolution in agriculture. Its impact has been especially notable on the dairy industry.

Bulk tanks, milking parlors and bar cleaners have replaced milk cans, milking stools and, regrettably, milkmaids.

What has been lost in color, however, has been compensated for by the gain in efficiency. Machines powered by electricity have removed much of the drudgery from the farmer's job.

I was struck by recent figures from the Department of Agriculture in this connection. They showed that the average number of man-hours needed to tend a dairy cow has been cut in half over the last 30 years, while the production per cow has doubled in that same period. So thanks to George Aiken and his counterparts in other parts of the nation, Vermont dairy farmers along with those in Wisconsin, Minnesota and elsewhere are producing twice as much milk per cow on half as much work-input.

George Aiken has also been in the forefront of the revolution in transportation. Since the 1930's rural road mileage in Vermont has increased seven fold. Like electrification, this advance has brought with its results which could hardly have been foreseen when it began. The highways have opened up most of Vermont's delightful countryside for recreation

in winter as well as summer. From elsewhere in the nation, Americans have been travelling here in ever increasing numbers to confirm for themselves that Vermont does, indeed, look like the landscapes painted by your/near neighbor Grandma Moses. late It is no wonder that tourism has become such a vital part of the State's income.

Then there is the Aiken Rural Water Act of 1965. It provides small communities throughout the nation with federal assistance in developing water and sewage facilities. It is bringing great benefits to this State and to many others, notably my own State of Montana. This landmark legislation passed the Senate by a unanimous vote in spite of the opposition of then President Lyndon B. Johnson. That tells you something of George Aiken's stature among his colleagues of both parties.

In recounting these achievements, I do not mean to leave the impression that Senator Aiken brought them about single-handedly. He would be the first to reject the label

"super-man or super-Senator." There are none and never have been in the Senate. Achievements are put together in that body out of a common response to a common need and many members participate in their creation. But someone has to set the train in motion. With regard to rural America, George Aiken's vision of the future, as seen from Vermont, has been a compelling inspiration. The great esteem with which he is held, moreover, has been a powerful force in giving substance to this vision. In my book and in many others, his support of a policy gives it automatic respectability. The fact is that his stamp of approval is a sort of national trademark for reliability.

George Aiken has done much in thirty years of Senate service to enhance the well-being, not only of those Americans who live the quiet life of farm and hillside but of all the people of the nation. His good sense has stood as a wall against assaults on the integrity of our national life. He has labored incessantly to keep in check the violently divisive

forces which tear at the fabric of the nation's unity. At the same time, he has worked to turn back the tides of bigotry which would erode the nation's meaning.

He is the epitome of the New England of Henry Thoreau. Yet, his decency and good sense are just as relevant to the entire nation--not only to well-kept village and hamlet but to eroded farmlands and wasted rivers, to run-down factory towns and to metropolitan areas [illegible] in shambles. This nation is in great need of human healing and George Aiken is one of its finest doctors.

As time goes on, moreover, more attention, is also being paid to his views on world affairs and peace. In that realm, he has not pursued the course of self-righteous isolationism--to use his own phrase. Rather, he has emerged in recent years as one of the most knowledgeable men in the Senate on international affairs. If the word statesman is applicable to anyone in the Senate, it applies to George Aiken. I have

travelled with him to all corners of the globe. His judgments of situations abroad have been, as they are at home--sound and clear--even in the most alien circumstances.

In underdeveloped nations of Southeast Aisa which we visited together, for example, Senator Aiken's background as a farmer gave him profound insights into the problems of those overwhelmingly rural lands. He saw clearly the incongruities of much which was being foisted upon them by us and others in the name of progress. Asians responded to him, not only as an American but as a human being, one of them, a man whose hands, too, had touched the soil. In Cambodia, as in Laos, in Viet Nam as in Burma, he left more friends than he found. George Aiken personified to them as he does to anyone who knows him the rejection of a philosophy that would presume to save a village by burning it down.

Above all else, George Aiken has been during these past few years, a voice pleading against deepening the tragedy

in Indochina. At the very beginning--and I am going back to 1965--he raised a flag of warning against the path we had entered on in Viet Nam. Time and again, ever since, he has urged a rational peace. Three years ago, he said that it was time for this country to conclude that the war was over and to declare that it had been won insofar as it could be won by our participation. He urged that the withdrawal of our forces begin without delay.

We have tarried too long. We have permitted the tragedy to spread too far from Viet Nam--into Cambodia and Laos. It has now rebounded to sow the seeds of a deepening division in this nation.

The approaches to Viet Nam which George Aiken urged long ago have taken too long to find their way into the policies of the government. Thousands more have died or been maimed during the delay.

One would hope that his most recent proposal will not go unheeded. He has called for a convening of Asian nations to find a solution to the problem of peace in Asia. That is a most reasonable suggestion. In the end, those nations will have the greatest stake in the kind of peace which is restored. It may be that the President's new and welcome initiatives towards China are a step in that direction. In any event, when peace does return to Asia, it will come sooner rather than later, because George Aiken has spoken out on the basis of his insights into the problems of that region.

We might well inquire into the source of these insights. Why is it that George Aiken sees clearly into so many situations whether they are on the banks of the Mekong or Memphremagog. The secret was revealed many years ago by someone who said:

"Youth is not radical; only embittered and frustrated youth (or any age for that matter) wants to overturn a social order that will give them no foothold or security. Nor is youth apt to be stand-pat. Given reasonable opportunity, youth is liberal and open-minded. That is why folks can be young at twenty-one or forty-five or eighty, for youth is a mental outlook. Everything is before them and they have a vast energy for doing..."

Today, the author of these lines is the senior Senator from Vermont. He is second ranking Member of the United States Senate in point of service. He is the Dean of the Republicans of the Senate. Except for the vagaries of politics he would be the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and third in succession to the Presidency. He would also be chairman of either the Foreign Relations Committee or the Committee on Agriculture.

The years have not dimmed the youthfulness of George Aiken's vision. They have not slowed the vigor of his step. In outlook, George Aiken remains more in tune with what the TV commercials refer to as the "now" generation than those who write them.

Because of our long-standing relationship, it has become something of a joke in the Senate to say that when Mike Mansfield speaks, you know what George Aiken is thinking and vice versa. It seems to me that this reciprocity might be given a more enduring form. I noted earlier in my remarks that the highest peak in the Green Mountain State bears the name Mansfield. It occurred to me that a suitable promontory in Montana might similarly be credited to the Senator from Vermont.

I am happy to be able to report that the reciprocity, in a sense, already exists. The highest point in Montana is called Granite Peak, and in the United States Senate the word "granite" is synonymous with "Aiken." The two words are associated with amazing regularity by colleagues and journalists alike. Only two weeks ago I had occasion to remind the Senate that granite typifies the character and stature of the man. So I hope that Senator Aiken will accept my assurance that the highest

mountain in Montana is really named after him. And I might just add that Granite or Aiken Peak, Montana, is three times as high as Mount Mansfield, Vermont which, I am happy to concede, is just the way it is with their respective namesakes.

To this man of gentleness and granite--to this man of integrity and humility--to this man who belong not only to Vermont but to all of us in this nation--I extend on behalf of all his colleagues in the Senate our love, affection and respect and to Vermont our thanks and appreciation for giving him to the Republic.

George Aiken is what we would all like to be.

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY

ADDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

at

BOSTON COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT, CHESTNUT HILL, MASSACHUSETTS

Monday, June 14, 1971, 10:00 a.m.

BEFORE THE BOOK IS CLOSED ON VIET NAM

It is a good place to be, today, here in this city and at this University. Boston is out of a chapter of liberty written a long time ago. Boston College is from a transcendent experience of love 2,000 years old. These two streams of human enlightenment flow together in today's commencement.

There are young people here and old. Whatever the differences in our years, we are brought face-to-face by these graduates. While chronological gaps between the generations are inevitable, credibility gaps are not pre-ordained. I shall try my best to avoid one in what I have to say to the class of 1971.

My remarks will be directed to what we have in common. Whatever we may not have, we have the United States in common and at a most difficult moment in history. Clearly, we are not passing through the best of times. Clearly, this is not freedom's finest hour.

Do not look to me, however, to condemn an older generation for the present state of affairs. Do not look for me, either, to blame the nation's plight on the young. Young people did not make the situation in which, together, we find ourselves; they have not yet had that opportunity. As for older generations, it is to be noted only that they have had time to add to the mistakes which they inherited when they were younger.

So, I will not lead this commencement in a search for scapegoats. Let me try, instead, to set forth where I think we are, how we have arrived at this point, and where we may hope to go from here. These questions cannot be considered except in the context of Viet Nam. Viet Nam is a book not yet closed.

It is, this unfinished war, the roadblock to the future. It remains a funnel into which is drawn a great segment ~~on~~ of the nation's ideals, energies and expectations.

What has transpired in Viet Nam is a tragic story told again and again. My own views have been placed before three Presidents. They have been stated in public on many occasions during the past five years and before. For these remarks, today, it is sufficient to note that fifty-five thousand Americans are dead in Viet Nam, cut out of life at an age not much different from that of this graduating class. The wounded are three hundred thousand. Well over $100 billion of public funds have been spent to support the war. Before the final reckoning (all the bills will not be paid until into the next century), the cost undoubtedly will have doubled and doubled again.

A large part of the national economy has been diverted to support this venture in Southeast Asia. What has

needed doing at home by government has not been done or not done very well. In the name of security against threats from Viet Nam, the inner security of the nation has been neglected.

We find ourselves, now with an economy that spurts and sputters but seems not able to hold a reliable momentum. Heavy unemployment is notable, especially among young people and returning veterans. A persistent inflation plagues us even as it erodes confidence in our currency abroad.

We find ourselves, too, living uneasily in a badly abused environment, with some scientists even dubious of the capacity of air, water and earth to continue to sustain us. Not only in pollution-control but in all public services--safety, transportation, education, sanitation, drug-regulation and whatever--shortcomings have been tolerated to the point of breakdown. The deterioration is especially serious in the urban complexes where, together, with the unabated tensions

of race and poverty, it casts a profound uncertainty over the inner stability of the nation.

These problems cry out for concentrated public attention. They call for an input of young energy, new leadership and fresh resources. It has not been forthcoming in adequate supply. That it has not is due in no small part to the diversions abroad.

Whatever may have led us into the conflict in Southeast Asia, it is now clear that the involvement has hit us where it hurts most--in the nation's inner unity. The war opened with a Presidential call for support of the Commander-in-Chief; it was met by a patriotic affirmation of national unity. Before the war is over, however, we will have gone through deeper divisions than any since the Civil War. In the end, the restoration of the nation's unity may well come again only in the common revulsion with the war.

For the present, the involvement goes on. Even as the President has sharply cut back the U. S. troop levels in Viet Nam--and he is to be commended for doing so--the actual involvement has spread from Viet Nam into Cambodia and Laos into an all Indochina war. We remain deeply enmeshed. We have yet to extricate ourselves.

It is now apparent that even though we may have thought to enter the war as welcomed liberators, circumstances are otherwise. We find, instead, that our policies have cast us in the role of military arbitrator of a brutal conflict which concerns other peoples. We find, too, that the conflict is not subject to resolution by the military intervention unless, indeed, Indochina is to be "saved" by being "destroyed" utterly.

We know now what we did not know at the outset. The involvement does not serve the interests of this nation or the Vietnamese people.

That is the bitter reality of this frustrating experience. : We have pursued a well-intentioned but impossible dream. In its pursuit, the lands and peoples of Indochina have been torn and battered almost beyond recognition. Young Americans have died in the tens of thousands. Vietnamese--men, women and children--have died in the hundreds of thousands. Three simple rice cultures--Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos--have been overwhelmed by the technology of modern warfare. Millions have fled the paddy fields, villages and hill-towns to escape the bombs and crossfire. They huddle as refugees in the cities, there to live in one way or another--including the widespread trafficking in heroin--off the troops. The swollen urban populations are fed, in part, by imported rice paid for by U. S. aid programs--ironically, in what is one of the richest rice surplus areas of the world.

Why? To what end? What impelled us into this ill-fated enterprise? What keeps us in it? How can we continue to order young men to war in Indochina?

These are questions which cannot be put aside. We have an obligation to clarify what we have been about in Viet Nam. That is an obligation which is owed to the living generations as well as to the future. It is a way of keeping faith with the men whom we sent to Viet Nam and who have not come back. Unless the questions are resolved in all honesty, this nation's historic purpose will emerge under the permanent cloud of the war. On the other hand, if an understanding of the tragic experience assures that this is, indeed, the last Viet Nam, then the sacrifices which have been asked will not be without meaning.

It is pointless, in this connection, to try to put the finger of responsibility on one President or another, on one party or the other, on the Defense Department, the

State Department or some other. We are all involved. There is no evading a national responsibility.

If the war is pursued, today, under a Republican Administration, it is not to be forgotten that the military escalation began under a Democratic Administration. If there are, now, Democratic Senators and Congressmen who seek to bring the war to a close forthwith, there are also Republicans whose dedication is to the same purpose. There are many who today are disenchanted with the conflict; there were very few at the outset, either Republicans or Democrats, who opposed the ever-deepening involvement. Indeed, who did not support or acquiesce in it?

In short, Viet Nam did not spring suddenly out of partisan politics. Nor did it begin just a few years ago, in 1969, 1966, 1964 or even 1961. In my judgment, the present involvement is a culmination of a foreign policy which was born before this graduating class.

Parents here, today, will remember a great war and its aftermath a quarter of a century ago. They will remember a tremendous military power assembled by a united people, a power which overwhelmed a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia.

This nation moved into the post-World War II era, intact and dynamic in contrast with vast areas of the world which lay in ruins around us, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt. In the circumstances, the international leadership of the United States was sought by friend and former enemy even as it was opposed by the Soviet Union. As we saw it, then, this nation's economic strength was the only hope for the recovery of what came to be called the "free world." As we saw it, too, this nation's military supremacy, including an atomic monopoly, was the principal bulwark against the aggressive spread of what was termed "monolithic Communism."

There began an era of foreign policy based on those premises. Tens of billions of dollars of materials,

services and credits poured out of the United States into other countries. Aid went to Western Europe, to Asia, to Latin America and eventually, to Africa. In the name of the United Nations, a war was fought and financed by this country to hold back Communism in Korea. We led the United Nations into a boycott of the revolutionary Chinese People's Republic and worked to exclude the Peking government from the world community. Multiple alliances were built which wove us into a common NATO defense of Western Europe and linked us in some sort of defense arrangements with about fifty nations. Hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad, into military garrisons and bases in Europe and Japan and elsewhere. Tens of billions of dollars worth of construction, equipment and weapons and nuclear warheads went with them.

These policies were devised in the name of national security and world peace. They were called accurately bipartisan and were described less accurately as a mutual

security program. The fact is that the policies were and to this day remain largely a one-sided effort of the United States. They rest now as they have long rested on the readiness of this nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost.

For years, there was little reason to question these policies. Congress was predisposed to accept the leadership of the President during a period of cold war. By the same token, allied nations were predisposed to accept the leadership of the United States which alone had the capacity to sustain this postwar system.

To be sure, there were flaws in the structure but they were not readily visible in the exhuberance of the times. In the first place, the security system relied so heavily on military power to maintain peace that an undue burden of responsibility was consigned to the Armed Services and an excessive drain was attached to the national economy. A zeal for a new-found internationalism, moreover, led us, beyond

essential national needs and humanitarian considerations, into an incautious involvement in almost every area of the world either in the name of "fighting Communism" or "promoting progress." This worldwide projection involved heavy expenditures for all kinds of aid-programs and the creation of elaborate U. S. official establishments abroad. Moreover, it prompted us to take on, as allies, a number of governments who were dependents in all but name. The great vitality of the postwar economy also created an erroneous belief in its inexhaustibility. Even as late as the onset of Viet Nam, we proceeded as though the nation could have not only guns and butter but also pay for fat and trimmings.

We pursued these policies, flaws and all, with little change for many years. We pursued,them, however, in a world which was changing greatly. The nation's atomic monopoly came to an end. The myth of "monolithic Communism" disappeared in the political shifts of Eastern Europe and in

the upheaval in the Chinese-Soviet relationship. Numerous new states appeared in the underdeveloped areas, as colonialism was being reduced to an historic relic. Europe recovered and went far beyond recovery to new heights of well-being. New economic dynamisms emerged, notably in Germany and Japan, even as our own economy showed signs of overwork if not exhaustion.

It was in these changed circumstances that we became involved in Viet Nam. We became involved for what had long been accepted as highly worthwile ends. We became involved in the name of resisting "aggressive Communism", in the name of "safeguarding international peace," and in the name of "honoring commitments" to a weak and dependent government.

We went into Viet Nam, in short, on the wheels of the same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had gone into Korea a decade and a half earlier. We did so,

however, almost as an habituated response, with far less understanding of the actual situation in Indochina, unmindful of the changes in this nation, in Asia and in the world.

Viet Nam was a mistake, a tragic mistake.

To persist in it now is to add outrage to the sacrifices of those who have suffered and who have died in this conflict.

To persist in it now is to do violence to the welfare of the nation.

The need is to terminate the mistake not to prolong it. No national commitments of this nation remain to be discharged to the governments in Indochina. We have armed, trained, financed and fought for those governments. We have done our share--far more than our share--to inject them with the elements of survival. What last ditch effort, as we are withdrawing, is likely to do anything more? Can the dragging out of the withdrawal do other than add to the tragedy?

What is needed forthwith is a redoubled effort to terminate the military involvement. What is needed is an end to the further accumulation of casulaties, costs and prisoners of war. What is needed is to bring about the safe return of U. S. forces and all prisoners of war. And when the guns fall still, what will be needed is to help restore the devastation of the war.

So far as I can see, initiatives which might serve these purposes have yet to be taken in the negotiations at Paris. It would be my hope, therefore, that the President with the cooperation of the Senate would seek in some appropriate negotiating forum an immediate cease-fire throughout Indochina on the basis of:

1) providing for a series of phased and rapid U. S. withdrawals in return for a series of phased releases of prisoners of war; and

2) a coupling of the final release of all U. S. prisoners with the final withdrawl of all U. S. forces by a specific date in the near future.

An agreement on this basis, it seems to me, could act to close out this ill-fated involvement. It would also bring about, I believe, the end of an era in the nation's international relations. Mistakes have been made during the past quarter of a century in the conduct of these relations. Do not think for a moment, however, that it has all been a mistake. Much that has been done had to be done, in the enduring interests of this nation. Much that is being done now needs still to be done.

A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for example, has been woven with the rest of the world. It serves for the mutual enrichment and contentment of hundreds of millions of people. By the same token, a sudden rupture of the web could

bring upheavals and conflicts of a most disastrous kind. We have also begun to perceive in these twenty-five years, I believe, the dimensions of the problem of maintaining permanent peace. We have come, too, to a greater awareness of the significance of human interdependency and mutual concern if the world is ever to know stability. Moreover, rudimentary machinery which can give expression to that awareness is now in existence.

It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter aftermath of Viet Nam, we were to turn our backs on this advance. It would be a step backward if we were to veer from what has been an excess of international involvement to an extreme of disinvolvement.

I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it is possible to withdraw from Viet Nam without seceding from the world. If we make that distinction--and I believe the people of this nation will make it--then it should be possible to withdraw

militarily not only from Indochina but from the Southeast Asian peninsula without abandoning our vital national interest in what transpires on the periphery of the Asian mainland.

Similarly, we should be able to reduce sharply the United States deployment of over half a million armed forces and dependents in Western Europe a quarter of a century after World War II without forsaking the essential mutual pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. We should be able, too, to exercise a firm and discriminating control over the enormous expenditures which are made in the name of national defense and, at the same time, still provide adequately for the defense of the nation. We should find it feasible to curb the corruption and carelessness which have filtered into the Armed Forces without demeaning and discouraging the millions of dedicated men and women who wear the uniform. We should be capable of shutting down obsolescent and over-extended aid

programs without losing a human compassion for the other people with whom we share the earth.

These adjustments involve, in the President's words, "lowering the profile" of the nation abroad. If they are to be made effectively, it seems to me that they must be accompanied by a new and vigorous effort of American diplomacy. That effort should be aimed at securing agreements with other nations which make international stability more dependent on mutual understandings and undertakings and less on the unilateral commitment of the military power of this or any other nation. Such agreements in the Far Pacific, for example, would have to involve not only the United States and Japan, but also the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the Philippines and other nations.

In Europe, a new and updated approach would presuppose a substantial shift of the burden of NATO from this nation to Western Europe--a step which, incidentally, is long overdue and will be pressed in the Senate until it is taken.

It will also call for agreements embracing both East and West Europe and the anomolous situation at Berlin. Indeed, in a new approach to the security of Europe it might be helpful if the Soviet Union and this nation were to stand to the side for a time and let the lead pass to the smaller European states on both sides of the divide. The efforts of the two super-powers might well be concentrated, instead, on ending the game of musical chairs with regard to disarmament, mutual reductions of their forces in Europe, and the control of nuclear weapons which has been pursued for so many years. In this connection, some risks for peace are clearly indicated if we are to reduce the ever-present and immediate risk of the collapse of human civilization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy. In matters of aid and assistance we will accept our share of responsibility for the well-being of the world but it will be a proportionately lower share than in the past and it will be discharged in cooperation with others.

In short, in the era ahead, we will get away from the excess of unilateral internationalism which has characterized our policies for the past two decades and try to recast our relations with others to the end that they are multilateral in substance as well as in name, to the end that the common burdens of the world are more equitably shared.

This transition will derive from Presidential leadership but not Executive fiat. It will depend, rather, on a concerted effort in which the President is joined by the Senate and the Congress, with each respectful of the Constitutional sensibilities of the other. Most of all, it will depend on a government which can be trusted by an informed people because it is credible in what it says and does and because it is alert and responsive to their needs.

You who graduate, today, and your counterparts throughout the nation, loom large in what may be anticipated during the decades ahead. You have the vote and, therefore,

are in a position to make your weight felt in the conduct of the government. That is a highly important aspect of your role in shaping the nation's future. Beyond it, however, there is the part which young people will have played in ending the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina.

That tragedy will be terminated; I would hope that it will be terminated very soon. The responsibility for bringing it to an end rests heavily on those of us who are the "old hands" of another generation. To move beyond Viet Nam into a future of peace will devolve just as heavily on you. To open a new era of constructive cooperation with the rest of the human race, to act with compassion and with high purpose, that is your opportunity, you who are the "new hands" of tomorrow. It is your life which lies ahead. It is your nation. It is your world. May you make the most of them all.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. MONTANA)
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ALCOHOLISM AND NARCOTICS
June 22, 1971
9:30 a.m.
Room 318, Old Senate Office Building

Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee this morning.

My purpose today is to give my unqualified support to your efforts towards solving the widespread and disheartening narcotics problem in the Armed Services of this nation. As you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, these problems are approaching the proportions of an epidemic. Unless dynamic and effective action is immediately taken, grave consequences will result not only in our Armed Services, but among the civilian communities of this country as well.

This Subcommittee has provided leadership in the Senate by focusing attention on this serious problem within the military. I know that you have had the support and approval of the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Stennis, and the ranking minority Member, Senator Smith. I want to assure you that the Democratic leadership of the Senate intends to cooperate fully with you as you attack this problem.

I have read your report submitted after an extended study which began over a year ago on drug addiction in the Armed Forces.

I found it complete, comprehensive, and sound in its recommendations. I am pleased to see that this past week the President has sent to the Congress a bill to concentrate the resources of the nation in a crusade against drug abuse. Undoubtedly, the actions of this Subcommittee were primarily responsible for calling attention to the urgency of this matter, and I am pleased to note that the Administration has adopted many of your recommendations.

Your Chairman has made it clear that this Subcommittee is health-oriented, wishes to avoid sensationalism, and is interested only in solving the problem. His considerable personal influence has been brought to bear on the Congress as well as the Department of Defense to the end that prompt and effective methods are being instituted for prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of military personnel who are the victims of drugs.

One need recall only a few of the distressing statistics to realize how widespread the problem of drug abuse is in the Armed Services; 30-40,000 of our Armed Forces in Vietnam addicted to heroin in one form or another; the side effect of 875 U. S. military deserters, many of whom are engaged in illegal drug activities; an addiction rate of over 15% among draftees serving in Vietnam; and estimates that drug experiments among our Vietnam servicemen may run as high as 80% compared with about 50% among U. S. civilian youth generally. A 1968 study also showed that over one-fourth of the 18-24 year olds at 22 U. S. military posts used marihuana and other drugs.

Although figures indicate the drug problem to be particularly prevalent among men serving in Vietnam, it is widespread throughout the Armed Forces, at home as well as abroad. It is obvious that these men are in dire need of help, yet few of them seek medical aid because they are afraid they may be prosecuted. This is no solution and only adds to the problem. It is time for the Defense Department to accept its responsibility for treating those within its ranks who are dependent upon drugs. Such individuals should be identified and encouraged to seek treatment and rehabilitation without fear of any punishment whatever.

As the distinguished Chairman of this Subcommittee has stated, if the drug epidemic continues to grow among our Vietnam forces and addicted men are restored to civilian society, uncured, we will only be transferring the violence of Indochina to the streets of America. It is an appalling thought when we recall that in the last two years 16,000 American military have been discharged for drug-related offenses, 11,000 of them under less than honorable conditions.

In the President's message to Congress on this subject, he stated, "The Department of Defense will provide rehabilitation programs to all servicemen being returned for discharge who want this help, and we will be requesting legislation to permit the military services to retain for treatment any individual due for discharge who is a narcotics addict. All of our servicemen must be accorded the right to rehabilitation."

On December 3, 1970, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, in its report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for 1971, made this statement:

> "For a considerable period the committee has viewed with growing concern increased evidence of drug use and drug abuse in the military services. It has also followed carefully the hearings held by subcommittees in both the Senate and House on the subject. The committee has also noted the awareness of the Department of Defense of the nature of the problem and the desire on the part of the Department to take remedial action.
>
> "However, it is the view of the committee that immediate action is necessary and desirable. Therefore, the committee strongly recommends that the Secretary of Defense consider the establishment within the Department of Defense of a drug rehabilitation center for the treatment of service personnel volunteering for such remedial care. It is the committee's belief that an additional medical facility could be located in unoccupied buildings at an existing base or at an installation presently planned for closing. Preferably, the location would not be located near a large metropolitan area. Such a facility could be provided under present authority with funds available to the Department of Defense.
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> "The committee recognizes that at the outset the program would probably be of a somewhat experimental nature, but believes that the urgency of the problem and the desirability of a solution that will benefit both the Department and the individuals involved make full consideration by the Department an immediate concern."

An ideal facility for this purpose exists at Glasgow Air Force Base Montana. The distinguished Chairman of this Subcommittee, Senator Hughes, has been there and knows of its potential. To the other members of the Committee, I would like to point out that

it has a completely modern, fully equipped, 50-bed hospital lying completely idle with x-ray machines, dental chairs, operating tables, pharmacy, kitchens - in other words everything necessary to provide immediate medical treatment of any sort. All that is needed is an adequate staff to operate it. There are family homes, dormitories, a gymnasium, schools, theaters, clubs, and other facilities which can be used by a rehabilitation program of this nature. Glasgow Air Force Base is 17 miles from the nearest town and that has only a population of approximately 5,000. Certainly, it is not located "near a large metropolitan area."

It is my understanding that when Senator Hughes recently proposed to the Glasgow community leaders that an alcohol and narcotics rehabilitation program could be located at the Base, he was assured of the full cooperation of the community. This cooperation was predicated on a well-run and carefully designed program.

Glasgow Air Force Base belongs to the Department of the Air Force. The taxpayers of this nation have already paid more than $150 million to build and maintain this installation. A $12 million mortgage against the homes alone remains to be paid off. It is essential that a productive use be found for this Base. It is fully modern, in fact one of the newest in the Air Force inventory, is completely equipped, and its facilities are immediately available.

I strongly encourage a closer look at this installation by this committee and the Department of Defense to determine whether it should be utilized in part for a model alcohol and narcotics rehabilitation program for active duty personnel of all services.

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

at

INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, INDIANA, PENNSYLVANIA

Columbus Day, Monday, October 11, 1971, 8:00 p.m.

FOREIGN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

When the history of this century is written, it may well be recorded that the whole international order shifted and reorganized itself in a short span of time in the early 1970's. For those of us who are living through today's changes, the accelerating transition is evident. What cannot be foreseen is whether the shift leads, in the end, to a new era of confrontation or toward a new plateau of international stability. How the die is cast depends heavily on the wisdom which we in the United States bring to our understanding of our times. That is why your inquiry here at Indiana University is so timely and appropriate.

Let me consider at the outset several manifestations of the current transition in the world and the responses to

them in the nation's foreign policy. The most immediate, of course, is the President's new economic program. Twenty-five years of over-extension has stretched the U. S. economy to the breaking point. To avoid a financial collapse, the President found it necessary to combine what amounts to de facto devaluation of the dollar plus a blanket increase in import duties with a domestic freeze of wages and prices.

Other countries have long been aware that something had to give in the way the U. S. government was managing the nation's financial affairs. When these moves came, however, they caused great distress, notably in Europe and Japan. What is feared abroad is not so much the moves themselves but what they could portend. At stake is their export markets in the United States and, hence, the possible evaporation of a great deal of their international purchasing power.

It is understandable, in the circumstances that the search for new economic alignments has intensified. The United

Kingdom is moving, for example, toward the European Economic Community, now, with the support of France. Germany and, in fact, the whole of Western Europe is tending toward closer commercial relationships with Eastern Europe. For its part, the Soviet Union seems eager to facilitate this shift and, is actively seeking to promote it through political stabilization. Thus, the Soviet government has acknowledged the legitimacy of West Berlin as an appendage of West Germany and is pressing for a wider agreement which would, in effect, legalize the territorial changes which were effected in Eastern Europe after World War II, including the division of Germany.

The United States is acquiescing, in these new trends in Europe, at a pace, however, which seems sometimes as reluctant as it is belated. U. S. policies are changing, too, with regard to the Far East. It seems to me, we are learning, in paying the terrible price of Viet Nam, the folly of extending ideological fears and great power animosities

into the inner conflicts of underdeveloped regions. In the process of learning, the Vietnamese war has been drained of meaning for this nation. It is revealed, now, as a tragic waste, a revelation that is reflected in the President's program of phased troop withdrawals. In that sense, the war is over for this nation; regrettably, what has yet to be ended is the military involvement. There is left in Southeast Asia, the vestiges of mistakes of the past and they continue to exact a toll of senseless death and devastation. One way or another--by the action of the President or the Congress and, hopefully, by both--these vestiges must be removed.

It may be that an end to the involvement will be facilitated by changes in the Sino-U. S. relationship which the President has been cultivating. In any event, China seems to be moving from a phase of isolation into one of more active participation in world affairs. The effect of this transition

and the U. S. response to it may well be causing internal distress in China, not to speak of consternation in the Soviet Union, in Japan and Taiwan.

There is a point of central significance in these and similar phenomena of international change. In a massive readjustment, the lingering legacies of World War II are being liquidated once and for all. What is occurring is a series of shifts in outlook and alignments of policy in many parts of the world. It is a cataclysmic process, analogous to the geological adjustments of the earth's crust when pent-up stresses give way along fault lines to produce a new equilibrium. The international upheaval, like its geological counterpart, causes sharp reverberations which are both widespread and unsettling.

It is somewhat surprising that so many historic dislocations should linger for a quarter century after the hostilities of World War II. In the past, matters of this

kind have often been settled more promptly--as they were at the close of World War I or as they were a century earlier following the Napoleonic Wars. The time lag after World War II is ascribable, in part, to the peculiar circumstances of peace when the guns fell silent in 1945. What had been a united coalition of victorious military allies, quickly split apart into mutually distrustful armed camps organized around antagonistic ideologies. Hovering over this split was the unprecedented threat of nuclear destruction.

There are those who contend that it was the ultimate reality of nuclear power which, alone, inhibited the post-war antagonists from rushing into another direct and more deadly confrontation. However that may be, the avoidance of a major confrontation between the two ideologies seems to have been bought, at least on our part, at the high cost of many peripheral confrontations, of which Viet Nam is the most recent

and, one would hope, the last. It was bought, too, at the price of lingering fears and suspicions about the intentions of both sides. In consequence, there have been massive disruptions of important domestic priorities in order to permit a wasteful indulgence in a fierce and costly arms competition which persists to this day.

We have, indeed, suffered what Shakespear called "the cankers of a long peace" and can welcome in principle, I believe, the present series of economic and political adjustments. They do hold promise of neutralizing the unhappy legacies of a war fought twenty-five years ago.

Some of the adjustments involve the removal of legal straitjackets which may come to be regarded, someday, as having been extended exercises in ideological rigidity and national pride. The long delay stems, in part, from the fact that the United States chose to engage in the diplomacy of non-recognition of Soviet-dictated territorial changes after

World War II and the consequences of the Chinese Revolution. For what seemed good and ample reasons at the time, it was felt necessary to cling to the pre-war territorial status quo in Europe, particularly with regard to Germany and the pre-revolutionary political status quo with regard to China. We are coming to realize, however, that such policies extended indefinitely are self-defeating and contrary to our own best interests. That is usually the case with policies based on dead fictions as opposed to living circumstances.

While changes in the legal perspective of our policies are certainly of significance, they are overshadowed for the moment by the more sweeping adjustments which seek to accommodate to contemporary economic realities. In general, these adjustments reflect the fact that the United States, having served in a variety of roles, as the world's chief banker, policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well as the chief

pioneer in outer space, has now approached the limits of its economic capcity and that some of the burdens have to be redistributed.

It is notable, I believe, that the current adjustments have concentrated on the commercial-financial elements of our international position--to the exclusion, unfortunately, of other over-extended roles abroad, which I shall discuss shortly. However, I would like to take a moment to consider at this point what has occurred under the President's new economic program. Essentially the program involves two basic elements of our commercial-financial relationships with other nations. The first is accessibility to markets, that is, the extent to which each nation opens its borders to the competing products of others. The second is the method of payments, or the settling of accounts between the nations.

In both spheres the economic power of the United States has been preeminent for the past quarter century. U. S. markets have absorbed vast quantities of goods from other nations and sent abroad even greater quantities. This nation has led world policy, notably in the so-called Kennedy round of tariff negotiations, into an era of vastly expanded international trade through the reciprocal removal of trade barriers.

At the same time, the U. S. has been at the core--the central banker, if you will--of the international payments system. The settling of accounts between nations has been based for a quarter of a century on the dollar and on its convertibility into gold. The system worked well as long as other nations were prepared to hold dollars in their reserves or had free access to U. S. gold. Neither of these conditions remains fully operative at this time. So a search for new devices to facilitate financial exchange is underway. In

recent international conferences, there have been proposals for the realignment of values among the various currencies, all acknowledging a lessening of the relative value of the dollar. There have also been proposals for devising an international substitute for the dollar as the central element in the international payments system.

Proposals of this sort reflect, in my judgment, both a healthy decline of others in their economic dependency on the United States as well as an unhealthy loss of confidence in the stability of the United States economic structure. Clearly, the "temporary" surtax on imports causes the deepest concern abroad. It is an understandable concern in major exporting nations as it ought to be on our part. In my judgment, the curtailment of international trade which is implicit in this measure is not the best way, in terms of the interests of the people of this nation, to bring our international payments into better balance. If, for no other reason, the new import levy, by raising the price of foreign

goods, creates a predisposition to higher prices for similar goods within the United States.

Because of immediate difficulties, we should not lose sight of the fact that the era of expanding international trade which we have fostered for two decades may go down as one of the truly positive advances in international relations in the 20th century. It has stimulated a highly useful economic exchange that has strengthened the fabric of world stability. It has served to underwrite, too, a long period of mutual economic well-being and cultural enrichment. Necessary though they may be, the new economic policies are, at best, temporary expedients. Without indulging, I hope, in excessive hindsight, I am bound to say that the adjustments might have been easier for us and all the world, had we faced up to our predicament at an earlier date and proceeded in a more measured way to negotiate the necessary relief.

So far, the other principal trading nations have eschewed acts of reprisal. That unfortunate possibility, however, does exist. Should there be a trade war, it would unravel the strands of a beneficial interdependence which have been woven so carefully over the past two decades.

In the circumstances, I endorse fully the President's stress on the temporary nature of the surtax and his emphatic opposition to a return to economic isolationism. The possibility of an inadvertant slide into what is eschewed, however, is not to be overlooked. To avoid it, it seems to me that we must take more fundamental steps to redress the economic balance than are contained in the New Economic Policy. We need to go beyond the negative sanctions so far invoked and deal with what, largely, precipitated the necessity for them in the first place.

This brings us to the non commercial aspects of the nation s international economic difficulties. Our present problem of balance of payments is not so much one of buying too much and selling too little of goods and services in international commerce, the fact is that, for years, we have sold far more than we have bought. Rather, the difficulty arises, in major part, from the spending of vast amounts of public funds in order to maintain an outmoded military-diplomatic position in

the world. Dollars spent abroad to underwrite that position flow overseas just as surely as those which go for imports of goods from other nations. Dollars spent at home to backstop that position contribute just as certainly to inflationary pressures as any other non-productive expenditure in the federal budget.

In my judgment, we are paying exorbitantly--in billions of dollars--to sustain foreign policies and practices which are simply out of date and which have little to do with the security and welfare of the people of the nation. Like other legacies of World War II, these policies and practices are in urgent need of revision.

There is no greater urgency than the liquidation of the war in Viet Nam. Ending the war is the most compelling business of this nation. The reason why that is so is obviously not only a matter of cost; before all else, Viet Nam is a human tragedy which tears at the fibers of the nation's cohesion.

Nevertheless, Viet Nam is a root cause of the nation's present economic difficulties. What is involved is an astronomical levy of government expenditure on the nation's economy in order to finance the war, to date, something in the neighborhood of $130 billion. This expenditure has burdened the productive economy at home with a heavy surcharge in taxes and inflation. Hence, it has reduced the competitive position of the nation's commerce in the world.

In two and a half years, it should be noted, the President has brought about a significant reduction of the cost of the involvement in Viet Nam. Prolonged as the reduc tion has been, it is all to the good. It is to be hoped, however, that what is being attempted is not simply a gradual tapering off of the war to a forgotten, Korean-type residue. In Viet Nam, that would still involve, for many years, in my judgment, continuing expenditures of billions in aid to the Saigon government as well as U.S. forces in coastal enclaves in order to shore up a regime with few roots in its own people.

It would be a continuation of a mistaken war by other means. It would be a way of being involved without seeming to be involved. Even if it were possible to attain, it would be a solution that is ill-suited to the needs of either Viet Nam or the United States.

The Senate has tried and is now trying, again, to establish a date certain for a total withdrawal of U. S. forces as the policy of this nation. Since definite assurances do not yet exist on this point, it can be expected that the matter will be pressed in the Congress; it will be pressed again and again until the involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland ends, lock, stock and barrel.

As in Southeast Asia, this nation's economy is carrying in Europe another archaic burden in the name of national defense. Two decades ago, the North Atlantic Treaty joined, in a common fate with Western Europe, the free survival of this nation. Insofar as I am concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty was valid then and remains pertinent to the nation's defense

needs today, it is not the treaty of alliance which is archaic; rather, it is the bureaucratic military structure of NATO which has grown up in its name that stands in need of adjustment.

NATO continues to correspond, today, to circumstances which were defined before many of you were born. At that time the free societies of Western Europe were heavily dependent on the United States and the fear of communist totalitarian take-overs was great. In terms of today's circumstances, NATO is over-staffed, over-manned, over-officered and over-financed by this nation. Of the budget of the Department of Defense, about $14 billion is estimated to be traceable to NATO. Over a half-million American servicemen and dependents are consigned to Europe.

That is an immense diversion of public resources. Yet, the basic question of NATO is not cost. If a commitment of that magnitude were essential for the security of the nation and the stability of peace, of course, it should be made. More

to the point, however, is whether a U. S. deployment of that size and composition has relevance to the situation in Europe a quarter of a century after World War II. In this connection, I returned just a month ago from a series of consultations in seven nations in Western Europe. The overwhelming mood of Europe is that of detente and peace; it is not of confrontation and war. The emphasis is on reconciliation; it is on intra-European trade, technological exchange, travel and other cultural interchange. It is not on military power or fear. Only in NATO are the games of war still played with any sense of expectancy or conviction.

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the European nations are prepared to have us shoulder the preponderant costs of the organization so long as we are prepared to do so. They have no readiness, not to speak of eagerness, to increase their own role or expenditures for NATO. While they want to maintain the North Atlantic Alliance, it is doubtful

that the Europeans see the need of the present force levels of NATO since they do not meet their commitments to them and have not done so for many years. It has seemed to me for a long time that a substantial reduction in our deployment in Europe is possible and desirable, even as similar steps have already been taken by the United Kingdom, Canada and others.

Let me emphasize my belief that we do need the North Atlantic Treaty and Alliance and we do need to preserve the structure of NATO as an element-in-being of western defense and unity. But I also believe the organization can be trimmed to a streamlined standby force without danger to our security or the stability of peace in Europe and with great benefit to the well-being of this nation.

Specifically, I have recommended that the United States undertake a reduction of its force commitment to NATO by at least 50 per cent, leaving no more than two U. S. divisions on the European continent. Hopefully, the Executive Branch will

take the initiative in this connection because it can do so without further ado. If necessary, however, efforts to that end will continue to be made in the Congress, cumbersome though it may be to try to legislate an action of this kind.

It would seem to me desirable, too, that a multinational NATO naval force should take over the Mediterranean patrol, thus permitting a sharp reduction in the overwhelming presence of the U. S. Sixth Fleet in that sea. In the same vein, substantial cuts in U. S. command participation in NATO and the designation of a European as the next NATO commander-in-chief would serve to reduce the presence of the United States in Western Europe and, of course, the cost which is entailed in that presence.

Changes of this kind are needed with regard to Europe and Asia if we are to adjust our policies effectively to the realities of the 70's. I think you will see that the changes which I have suggested involve an end to flailing at the fears of the past. They have much to do with an end to the illusions of omnipotence and adventurism and a greater sharing of the glare

of leadership which has focused upon this nation for too long. They have to do, in short, with what the President, I believe, was talking about when he introduced the 'low profile" concept of the Nixon Doctrine. Unless and until we make these changes, the new economic policy will be, at best, only a stop gap for our difficulties.

We may anticipate the most serious consequences both at home and in our relationships abroad unless we grasp the extent of the transition in world affairs over the past quarter of a century. During these years, we have come only haltingly through successive and delayed stages of adjustment. We are paying now for the time gaps in our official perception and responses to changing international realities. We are paying for it in the economic faltering at home and, more seriously, in the tragedy of Viet Nam.

We stand, now, on the threshhold of a new era in which prime motivations are appearing which are other than the fear of aggression and war. There may exist a possibility of breaking

down antagonisms along the gulf separating the Communist states from those of the Western world. Entered with a clear head and sure foot, this era may yield the fruits of peace to nations prepared to take the risks of peace.

The promise is there; it may be that it will fall to a younger generation to work out that promise. I hope that your vision of the world will be far less constrained than ours has been for the past twenty-five years. With luck, you may be able to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial defense or of the defense of ideological systems, but rather as an element of human survival and well-being. National resources can then be committed in far greater degree to the fundamental problems which know no boundaries of race or nationality: population numbers, the preservation of natural resources, pollution abatement and the enlightenment of the human spirit wherever and however it is oppressed.

Your deliberations here can help to bring that day closer. I urge you to continue the quest.

FOR RELEASE WEDNESDAY A.M.'s

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

at the

CAROLINA FORUM, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHAPEL HILL, NORTH CAROLINA

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1971 - 8:00 p.m., e.d.s.t.

NEW APPROACHES TO FOREIGN RELATIONS

It may well be recorded in the future that the whole international order shifted and reorganized itself in a short span of time in the early 1970's. The accelerating transition is evident for those of us who are living through today's changes. What cannot be foreseen is what the shift portends. Does it lead to a new era of confrontation or toward a new plateau of international stability? How the die is cast depends heavily on the wisdom which we in the United States bring to our understanding of our times.

At the outset, I would point to several manifestations of the current transition in the world and the responses to them in the nation's foreign policy. The most immediate, of course, is the President's new economic program. Twenty-five years of over-extension has stretched the U. S. economy to the breaking point. In what amounted to a financial crisis, the President combined a de facto devaluation of the dollar and a

blanket increase in import duties with a domestic freeze of wages and prices.

That something had to give in the way the U. S. government was managing the nation's financial affairs was evident for a long time. When the moves came, however, it is understandable that they caused great distress abroad. What is feared elsewhere, notably in Europe and Japan, is not so much the moves themselves but what they could portend. At stake are the export markets in the United States and, hence, the shrinking of a great deal of international purchasing power.

It is understandable, in the circumstances that the search for new economic alignments has intensified. The United Kingdom is moving, for example, toward the European Economic Community, now, with the support of France. Germany, in fact the whole of Western Europe, is tending toward closer commercial relationships with Eastern Europe. For its part, the Soviet Union seems eager to facilitate this process through political stabilization. Thus, the legitimacy of West Berlin as an

appendage of West Germany has been acknowledged and the Soviet government is pressing for agreement to legalize the territorial changes in Eastern Europe after World War II, including the division of Germany. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the German Chancellor Willy Brandt, which, in my judgment, is well deserved, traces in major part to the impetus that he has given to these developments. The United States is acquiescing, in the new trends in Europe, at a pace, however, which seems sometimes as reluctant as it is belated, and one would hope that the President's planned visit to Moscow represents an acceleration of the adjustment.

U. S. policies are in transition, too, with regard to the Far East. It seems to me, we may have learned, at last in Viet Nam, the folly of extending ideological fears and great power animosities into the inner conflicts of under-developed regions. The Vietnamese war has been drained of

meaning for this nation. It is revealed, now, as a tragic waste, a revelation that is reflected in the President's program of phased troop withdrawals. In that sense, the war is over for this nation. There is left in Southeast Asia, however, the vestige of the mistakes of the past which continue to exact a toll of senseless death and devastation. One way or another--by the action of the President or the Congress or by both--that vestige must and will be removed.

Perhaps, an end to the Indochinese involvement will be facilitated by the re-awakening of the Sino-U. S. relationship. In any event, China seems to be moving out of a phase of isolation into one of more active participation in world affairs. The effect of this transition and the U. S. response to it may well be causing internal distress in China, the Soviet Union, in Japan and Taiwan and, undoubtedly, new thoughts in all of them.

There is a point of central significance in these and similar phenomena. The lingering legacies of World War II are being liquidated in a massive readjustment. It is a cataclysmic process, analogous to the geological adjustments

of the earth's crust when pent-up stresses give way along fault lines to produce a new equilibrium. The international upheaval, like its geological counterpart, causes sharp reverberations which are widespread and unsettling.

What is involved in the adjustments, is, in part, the removal of certain legal straitjackets, self-imposed, which may come to be regarded, someday, as having been extended exercises in ideological rigidity and national pride. An example is the prolonged diplomacy of non-recognition in which we chose to engage after World War II. We refused to countenance the Soviet enforced territorial changes in Eastern Europe or the consequences of the Chinese Revolution. For what seemed good and ample reasons at the time, it was felt necessary to cling to the pre-war territorial status quo in Europe, particularly with regard to Germany, and the pre-revolutionary political status quo for China. We are coming to realize, I believe, that such policies extended indefinitely are self-defeating and contrary to this nation's best interests. That is usually the

case with policies based on dead fictions as opposed to living circumstances.

The changes in the legal perspective of our policies are over-shadowed for the moment by the adjustments which seek to accommodate to contemporary economic realities. In general, these adjustments reflect the fact that the United States, having served in a variety of roles, as the world's chief banker, policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well as the chief pioneer in outer space, has now approached the limits of its economic capacity and that some of the burdens and the "firsts" have to be redistributed. At last reports, I understand, we had even abandoned the efforts of the cultural warriors to "catch up" and surpass the Russians in the classical ballet.

Current adjustments in our international position have concentrated more heavily on the commercial-financial elements than on certain other over-extended roles abroad, which I shall discuss shortly. However, I would like to take a moment to consider at this point what has occurred under the

President's new economic program. The economic power of the United States has been preeminent in the world for the past quarter century. U. S. markets have absorbed vast quantities of goods from other nations and sent abroad even greater quantities. This nation has led world policy, notably in the so-called Kennedy round of tariff negotiations, into an era of vastly expanded international trade through the reciprocal removal of trade barriers.

At the same time, the U. S. has been the central banker, of the international payments system. Settling of accounts between nations has been based for a quarter of a century on the dollar and on its convertibility into gold. The system worked well as long as other nations were prepared to hold dollars in their reserves or had free access to U. S. gold. Neither of these conditions remains operative at this time. So a search for new devices to facilitate financial exchange is underway. In recent international conferences, there have been proposals for the realignments of values among the various

currencies, all acknowledging a lessening of the relative value of the dollar. There have also been proposals for devising an international substitute for the dollar as the central element in the international payments system.

Proposals of this sort reflect, in my judgment, both a healthy decline in the economic dependency of others on the United States as well as an unhealthy loss of confidence in the stability of the United States economic structure. Clearly, the "temporary" surtax on imports causes the deepest concern abroad. It ought to be of similar concern on our part. In my judgment, the curtailment of international trade which is implicit in this measure is not the best way, in terms of the interests of the people of this nation, to bring international payments into better balance. If, for no other reason, the new import levy, by raising the price of foreign goods, creates a predisposition to higher prices for similar goods within the United States.

Far more important, we should not lose sight of the fact that the era of expanding international trade which we have fostered for two decades may go down as one of the truly positive advances in international relations in the 20th century. It has stimulated a highly useful economic exchange that has strengthened the fabric of world stability. It has served to underwrite, too, a long period of mutual economic well-being and cultural enrichment.

Necessary though they may be, the new economic policies are, at best, temporary expedients. Without indulging, I hope, in excessive hindsight, I am bound to say that the adjustments might have been easier for us and all the world, had we faced up to our predicament at an earlier date and proceeded in a more measured way to negotiate the necessary relief.

So far, the other principal trading nations have eschewed acts of reprisal. That unfortunate possibility, however, does exist and on the basis of very recent reports has now been

expressed for the first time by a reciprocal tariff increase by Denmark. That is a small beginning. Should there be a trade war, it would unravel the strands of a beneficial interdependence which have been woven so carefully over the past two decades.

In the circumstances, I endorse fully the President's stress on the temporary nature of the surtax and his emphatic opposition to a return to economic isolationism. The possibility of an inadvertant slide in that direction, however, is not to be overlooked. To avoid it, it seems to me that we must take more fundamental steps to redress the economic balance than are contained in the New Economic Policy.

This brings us to the non-commercial aspects of the nation's international economic difficulties. Our present problem of balance of payments is not so much one of buying too much and selling too little of goods and services in international commerce; the fact is that, for years, we have sold a great deal more than we have bought. Rather, the difficulty arises,

in major part, from the spending of vast amounts of public funds in order to maintain an outmoded military-diplomatic position in the world. Dollars spent abroad to underwrite that position flow overseas just as surely as those which go for imports of goods from other nations. Dollars spent at home to backstop that position contribute just as certainly to the inflationary pressures as any other non-productive expenditure in the federal budget.

In my judgment, we are paying exorbitantly--in billions of dollars--to sustain foreign policies and practices which are simply out of date and which no longer have much to do with the security and welfare of the people of the nation. Like other legacies of World War II, these policies and practices are in urgent need of revision.

There is no greater urgency than the liquidation of the war in Viet Nam. Ending the war is the most compelling business of this nation. It is obviously not only a matter of cost; before all else, Viet Nam is a vast human tragedy which

tears at the fibers of the nation's cohesion. Nevertheless, Viet Nam is also a root cause of the nation's present economic difficulties. What is involved is an astronomical levy of government expenditure on the nation's economy in order to finance the war, to date, something in the neighborhood of $130 billion. This expenditure has burdened the productive economy at home with a heavy surcharge in taxes and inflation, hence, reducing the competitive position of the nation's commerce in the world. A great deal of it, moreover, has been spent abroad, contributing directly to the negative balance of payments.

In two and a half years, it should be noted, the President has brought about a significant reduction of the cost of the involvement in Viet Nam. Prolonged as the reduction has been, it is all to the good. It is to be hoped, however, that what is being attempted is not simply a gradual tapering off of the war to a forgotten, Korean-type residue. In Viet Nam, that would still involve, for many years, in my judgment,

continuing expenditures of billions in aid to the Saigon government as well as the maintenance of U. S. forces in coastal enclaves in order to shore up a regime with few roots in its own people. It would be a continuation of a mistaken war by other means. It would be a way of being involved without seeming to be involved. Even if it were possible to attain, it would be a solution that is ill-suited to the needs of either Viet Nam or the United States.

The Senate has tried to establish a date certain for a total withdrawal of U. S. forces as the policy of this nation. Since definite assurances do not yet exist on this point--and I might say that the outright opposition of the Executive Branch on this matter only leads to apprehensions as to what the long range intentions really are--it can be expected that the matter will be pressed in the Congress; it will be pressed again and again until the involvement on the Southeast Asian Mainland ends, lock, stock and barrel. As elusive as it has

seemed, the day must and will come when the last U. S. soldier boards the last troop carrier, the last helicopter lifts off Vietnamese soil, and the last U. S. troop ship leaves the Vietnamese coast.

When we leave Indochina, we will have closed the book on military involvement on the Asian mainland. It would not be in this nation's interest, however, to close our eyes to what transpires on the other side of the Pacific. It is time to ask ourselves now what we will remain, not just in Viet Nam but in all of East Asia, not in terms of the devastation and disruption which is self-evident but in terms of new policies which will safeguard this nation's interest and contribut more effectively to peace in the years ahead.

It has seemed to me that the Nixon Doctrine might contain guiding principles in this respect. In my judgment, that will not be the case unless the Doctrine means the complete termination of U. S. military involvement everywhere

on the Asian Mainland. It will not be the case unless the Doctrine means an end to the practice of maintaining quasi-dependencies of the United States in Southeast Asia. In short, the high purposes of the Nixon Doctrine will be ill-served if it is bent in practice to sanction a continuing intervention, direct or indirect, in the inner affairs of Asian peoples.

On the other hand, the Doctrine will have constructive meaning for the years ahead, if it implies as I believe it implies, a new era of shared responsibility, not only in Asia but throughout the world. It will have constructive meaning if it both preaches and practices a new relationship with other nations. It will have that meaning if it calls for "no more Viet Nams" and "no more Cambodias" anywhere in the world. In my judgment, international circumstances neither warrant nor permit, as in the past, the pursuit of peace by the exercise of the predominant effort of the United States. The New

Economic Policy should make clear to all that we are headed down the road to national debilitation if we continue to pursue peace on that basis.

What, then, of the future of U. S. policy in the Western Pacific? The answer, it seems to me, is a clearer and cleaner perception of our national interests in the Western Pacific and an attempt to serve them by a new and flexible system of relationships. Let me say that, as a starter, I fully support the initiatives of the Administration in seeking to build a contact of civility with Mainland China. This process of diplomatic bridge-building, however, ought not to proceed in isolation. It should not lead us to by-pass other anchor-stones which have already been set in place. In this connection, it should be noted that the U. S. approach to Peking burst on the Japanese government with disturbing suddenness. It came at a time when Japan already was in a sensitive position due to a special vulnerability to this nation's new economic

policies as well as to the contraction of our military projection in Southeast Asia.

In any event, the emergence of China from a period of isolation does seem to me to open new approaches to Pacific security by the avenue of negotiations. One would hope, for example, in the not too distant future, for quadripartite discussions between China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States. Such discussions could do much to allay unwarranted fears and establish a basis for adjusting national interests. They could provide insights into vital questions involving the internal situation in China, including the status of Taiwan, into the anxieties and intentions of the Soviet Union in the Western Pacific, into the economic needs not only of Japan and the U. S. but of all four nations, and into the prospects for curbing nuclear developments in Asia. Of immediate importance, quadripartite

discussions might provide a vehicle for stabilizing and restoring the Indochina peninsula in the post-war era. Any regional security arrangements which might ensue therefrom could be dovetailed with a progressive reduction in the U. S. military presence around the rim of Asia over the next few years.

In Europe there is also a need to cut outmoded military commitments by new security arrangements, the door to which has now been opened by West Germany and the Soviet Union. Insofar as this nation is concerned, it is long past the time to lighten the archaic burdens of NATO. Two decades ago, the United States joined the nations of Western Europe in a common commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Treaty remains pertinent today, but the bureaucratic organization--NATO--which has grown up under the Treaty corresponds not so much to contemporary circumstances in Europe but to those which existed in Europe before many of you were born.

At that time, the free societies of Western Europe were heavily dependent on the United States and the fear of Communist totalitarian takeovers was great. A war was raging in Korea. It was a time of trouble, of great international uncertainty.

That is not the scene today. Against what is now visible--a prosperous, stable Western Europe and a growing contact with Eastern Europe, NATO is over-staffed, over-manned, over-officered and over-financed by this nation.

Of the budget of the Department of Defense, about $14 billion is estimated to be traceable to NATO. Over a half-million American servicemen and dependents are still consigned to Europe. That is an immense diversion of our resources. Yet, the basic question of NATO is not cost. If a commitment of that magnitude were essential for the security of the nation and the stability of this nation's peace, of course, it should be made. More to the point, however, is whether a huge U. S. deployment in Europe continues to have relevance a quarter of a century after World WarII.

In this connection, I returned just a month ago from a series of consultations in a number of nations in Western Europe. The overwhelming mood there is that of detente and peace; it is not of confrontation and war. The emphasis is on reconciliation; it is on intra-European commerce, technological exchange, travel and other cultural interchange. It is not on military power or fear of military conflict. Only in NATO circles are the games of war still played with any sense of expectancy or conviction in Western Europe.

Let me reiterate my belief that we do need the North Atlantic Treaty and Alliance. We do need to preserve the structure of NATO as an element-in-being of western defense and unity. But I also believe the organization can be trimmed to a streamlined standby force and our proportionate role can be reduced. I am persuaded that that can be done without additional danger to our security or the stability of peace in Europe and with great benefit to the nation's well-being. I am persuaded, too, that unless it is done soon, Western unity may very well give way under the weight of its anachronisms.

There is a basic lesson in the excesses of policy in Europe and Asia of the past decade or more. It should be recognized and applied to other areas of the world. It is this: Military and other national power calcified around rigid foreign policies tends to be not only wasteful but dangerous to the nation's future. We must become extremely wary of all commitments of military assistance and all forms of foreign aid in areas of instability abroad where our national interests are not wholly clear or clearly at stake.

That applies with special relevance today to our involvement in the chronic troubles of the Mideast. It hardly needs to be said here that there is a great deal of sympathetic interest in this nation with regard to the survival of Israel. It is not inconsistent with either that sympathy or the interests of this nation, however, to avoid a U. S. military entrapment in the Middle East which can take the form of an inadvertent military confrontation with the Soviet Union or another Viet Nam.

What is in our national interest in the Mideast, as it is in the interests of all the nations of that region and the world is the stability of the present truce, the resolution of territorial conflicts, and, remote as the possibility may now seem, progress towards a new era of co-existence and economic interchange between Israel and the Arab States.

In this connection, I support the efforts of the Secretary of State in cooperation with others to secure an interim peace agreement which has as its main objective the reopening of the Suez Canal. As I understand them, the Secretary's proposals provide for preliminary agreement on a cease fire and on the principle of troop withdrawal without final or complete agreement at this time. The rationale, I should think, is that agreement on this ultimate objective, may make it possible to locate way-stations en route.

If military restraint and a new emphasis on multilateral action applies in Asia and the Middle East, it applies, too, with regard to Latin America. Policies for the Southern hemisphere, it seems to me, must resist temptations to extend additional military or other unilateral aid and to reduce further what now flows through these channels. Unilateral aid can come to represent an intrusion into volatile political environments and lead, in the end, to direct involvements.

It should be noted that just last week, the Senate passed legislation to fund the Inter-American Development Bank at the annual rate of $900 million for the next two years. This multi-national institution, along with others of its kind, should constitute the heart of the nation's foreign economic aid policy. The sooner it brings about the termination of unilateral U. S. assistance the better for all concerned.

Let me close these remarks on the same note on which they were opened. Let me stress my belief that we have

come to a notable turning point and a notable moment of opportunity. We will have to make many changes to adjust policies effectively to the realities of the 1970's. The changes have much to do with an end to the illusions of national omnipotence and omniscience and the tragic adventurism to which they have led in Southeast Asia. The changes involve a readiness to share the glare of world leadership which has focused upon this nation for too long.

We stand, now, on the threshhold of a new era in which prime motivations are appearing which are other than the fear of aggression and war. There may exist a possibility of breaking down antagonisms along the gulf separating the Communist states from those of the Western world.

The promise is there. To realize it will take a vision of the world far less constrained than has been the case for the past twenty-five years. We will have to begin to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial defense or the defense of ideological systems, but rather as

an element of human survival and well-being. National resources can then be committed in far greater degree to the fundamental problems which know no boundaries of race or nationality: Population control, the preservation of natural resources, pollution abatement and the enlightenment of the human spirit wherever and however it is oppressed.

FOR RELEASE FRIDAY A. M.'s

ADDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
at the
1971 EISENHOWER SYMPOSIUM, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
Thursday, November 18, 1971, 8:00 p.m.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: POWER IN TRANSITION

I am delighted to find myself delivering the benediction at these proceedings. It is an uncommon experience. The last word is something that is rarely reserved for the Leadership in a Senate of unlimited debate.

Notwithstanding this built-in propensity for talk, however, the Senate has acted with unusual dispatch during the past few weeks. While this symposium has pondered the dilemmas of power, the Senate has sought to resolve several of them.

With regard to Viet Nam, for example, the Senate voted first to establish a national policy of full withdrawal

within six months. Later, at the insistence of the House, which had an assist from the Administration, the specific time span was removed and full withdrawal was accepted only as a Congressional rather than a national policy. Still later, in other legislation, and with the reluctant concurrence of the House and the Administration, the Senate's insistence on full withdrawal from Viet Nam was established as national policy but still without a specific withdrawal date. Finally, in a foreign aid bill, the Senate is making one more effort to restate its pristine and more emphatic position on Viet Nam, that is, full withdrawal within six months.

In similar tugs and starts and stops, the Senate voted to cut, then to increase parts of foreign aid, then to reject it in toto, only to resuscitate most of the Administration's aid program in two bills a short time later, underscoring the fact that foreign aid is a program with more lives than a cat.

Contrary to the appearances, these actions are more than marches up the hill and down. They are not empty gestures. They say what the people of thenation are saying. In language which is audible in the other Branches they say that the Senate wants the war in Viet Nam to end completely and soon. They say, too, that the Senate is growing insistent on a sweeping revision and scale-down of foreign aid.

The apparent indecisiveness of the actions arises, in part, from the fact that there are other centers of federal power--in the House and in the Presidency--wherein other ideas are held and with which the Senate must come to terms. It is also a reflection of a kind of dilèmma of power: it is symptomatic of the uncertainty of the Congress in confronting the salient factor of the contemporary international situation.

I am sure this symposium has long since identified that factor. It is the surge of change which is sweeping the globe. From the rimlands of Asia to the western littoral of

Europe international relationships of a generation are giving way; just as currencies, fixed in value for decades, are now floating, so too are old alliances and alignments.

In this nation, a new outlook is readily detectable. It is present especially in the young who are not bound by the fixations of the past but it is by no means confined to the young. The international experiences of the past few years have shocked the thought patterns of the entire nation.

In the United States, the time for a change in foreign policy is ripe. If this situation finds a counterpart in the Soviet Union, then we may well be on the threshhold of the liquidation of the dubious heritage of the cold war. Ironically, the era of cold war is ending not in the "positions of strength," which at one time were regarded in U. S. policy as an essential of peace; indeed, the Secretary of Defense has even raised doubts about the present capacity of our defenses. Nor is the cold war closing in drastic changes in the state systems of

Eastern Europe, or the West, which, once in the eyes of more militant ideologists in both countries, were held to be the only basis for its ending.

Rather, the heat has been taken out of the cold war, if I may mix the temperatures, by degrees. Old conflicts have dissolved slowly in symposia such as the one which is taking place here, to which I allude as symbolic of the growth of peaceful interchange between the two systems.

The old conflicts are also diluted by the emergence of other international considerations which have pressed into the purview of the two nations. China, for example, now looms large in the concerns of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the United States is immersed in the practical and urgent threats to the economy, more or less to the exclusion of the theoretical and distant menaces of alien ideologies.

Ironically, this transition comes at a time when the affairs of the nation are presided over by a Republican

Administration which was once in the front ranks of what was termed the "battle for the minds of men." May I say that the irony is all to the credit of the incumbent political leadership. The President has been able to set aside the things of the past. In the light of present realities, he is acting to remove some of the barnacles which encrust the foreign policy of the United States.

Without detracting from the Administration's achievement in any way, I think it is fair to note that the times have been over-ripe for this change. I like to think, too, that the level of reason is such in this nation that the transition might have come under any perceptive administration of whatever partisan stripe. But, perhaps, that is an excessively sanguine expectation. In any event, there is little question of the general effectiveness of the incumbent Administration. It is an effectiveness which tends to support Walter Lippmann's thesis that liberal change is best brought about by conservative government.

The critical element in the Administration's new approach to international policies, it seems to me, is the Nixon Doctrine which was unveiled in Guam in 1969. That Doctrine set the stage for a diminution of the role which the United States has played across the spectrum of world affairs for 25 years. In so doing, it elevated a concept of policy much articulated but little practiced since World War II--that of shared responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. The changes which have been wrought by the Doctrine are already evident not only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere around the globe, as bases are closed and U. S. military forces abroad are reduced.

In some quarters, there is a tendency to see in this process of military contraction some sort of shameful furling of the flag. Rather, the change is sensible and long overdue. It acts to reduce the too heavy burdens which have been carried for too long by the people of the nation often in the vague name of "international commitment." Moreover, if the flag has

been placed by a mistaken policy in places where it does not belong--as in Indochina--its withdrawal under the Nixon Doctrine is not only an essential act in our vital national interests, it is also the only honorable course. Indeed, if the Doctrine is to have historic significance in my judgment, it will bring about not a partial but a complete termination of U. S. military involvement in Southeast Asia; that means everywhere on the mainland, be it in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand and by land, sea and air. The Doctrine will also provide, if it is to have historic significance, the rationale for a continuing reduction in our one-sided military efforts elsewhere in the world, notably, in Western Europe under NATO.

Notwithstanding the diminution of the U. S. military presence abroad, the United States is not about to disappear from the international scene. This nation's weight is immense and it will continue to be felt in many ways and in many places.

That is as desirable as it is inevitable. Indeed, a sensitive concern with affairs beyond our borders remains an essential of the world's civilized survival. That such is the case argues strongly for a most judicious use of our resources abroad. There is no longer a surplus to be expended in haphazard, almost indiscriminate fashion, for fear that the label of isolation may otherwise be pinned on our policies.

It is reassuring, therefore, that along with the military contraction, the omnipresence of U. S. economic aid is also in the process of receding around the globe. In this scale-down which affects largely the bilateral programs of aid, the Senate has played and will continue to play an important part. It is to be anticipated that pressure from the Senate will bring about further changes in the basic design of the program.

The fact is that the present system has lost much of the charisma which was imparted to it by the Marshall Plan, the Point-Four program and the Peace Corps of another time. Foreign